At the heart of his discussion of motivation is a culture of honour among the men and the key importance of networks of friendship and loyalty. Men felt shame at defeats that were not their fault and bravery was very important. ‘Withstanding hardships was a point of pride’ (p. 182). Generosity, especially buying drinks for comrades, was valued and those who did not conform were ostracised. Men helped and supported each other, and felt guilty if they did not fight with their comrades.

Berkovich brings out how soldiers of different nationalities gave similar accounts of why men did their duty in combat. Interestingly they attributed similar motivation to their enemies. They mentioned ‘personal bravery, hope of reward and fear of punishment’ and thought that veterans learned to approach danger ‘without thinking’ (p. 195). They approved of fighting for king and country, religion, fatalism and hedonism gave consolation and they thought that enemy committed barbaric crimes. Officers’ patronage was important and their social authority was reinforced by moral authority gained from taking care of the welfare of their men, fighting beside them, encouraging them before battles and thanking them afterwards. They also kept them in touch with wider military developments.

Overall, the cumulative evidence that coercive discipline played a relatively minor role in the motivation of common soldiers is strong. Although I think that the interpretative value of Berkovich’s use of sociological theory is variable, it is always interesting, and he never allows the theory to distort his interpretation of the evidence.

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Established in 1933, Dachau was the first concentration camp in Hitler’s Germany and a stronghold of the Nazi revolution. In Dachau & the SS, historian Christopher Dillon studies the men who guarded the camp. Dillon sees Dachau as a crucial training ground for the atrocities that were to come; the camp was an ‘academy of violence’, whose graduates would go on to staff and command other camps throughout the Nazi empire. The ‘Dachau School’ taught the SS the methods of terror, and instilled in them a highly gendered ethos of male comradeship, loyalty, and steely determination. Unfortunately, the Dachau SS managed to destroy most of
their files toward the end of the war but Dillon makes excellent use of the limited source material at his disposal. The result is a major contribution to research on Nazi perpetrators.

Dillon’s analysis of the Dachau SS straddles the universalistic/particularistic divide that has polarized much scholarship on the perpetrators. Neither the historical particularities of German culture in the 1930s nor more universal group dynamics can alone account for the guards’ actions; as Dillon’s sophisticated interpretation makes clear, any convincing explanation of the violence must incorporate both cultural, psychological and situational aspects. From a cultural and historical perspective, the Dachau SS were certainly products of their time. Having lived through the tumultuous years of the interwar period, these men had experienced the profound insecurity and humiliation of long-term unemployment. Service in a concentration camp came with a stable income and the prospect of swift career advancement – the chance to become ‘somebody’. The SS stressed volunteerism and idealism; obedience was a moral virtue, not a legal requirement. The men volunteered for guard duty, they chose to put themselves in this situation, and if they did not feel up to the task, they were in principle free to leave. All recruits outwardly embraced the ideology and violence of the Nazi movement; many had previously fought ideological opponents on the streets of the Weimar Republic. The guards saw themselves not as prison wardens, but as political soldiers. In their minds, the concentration camps were the front line in a civil war against the enemy within.

Service in Dachau quickly radicalized the guards. The men who oversaw daily life in the camp had to display ideological zeal and political reliability, and they were supposed to demonstrate these qualities through violence. Creativity and diligence in abusing prisoners were the path to promotion and social status. The camp turned into a ‘terroristic theatre’, Dillon writes, where guards could mould their ‘stage personae’ and project an image of ‘exquisite devilishness’. The presence of superior officers would fuel the guards’ aggression, while the absence of an audience tended to reduce the level of violence. Dillon explores these group dynamics through a nuanced and critical reading of the literature on obedience and conformity, deepening our insight into the social psychology of mass atrocity.

Dillon also demonstrates that the violence had a momentum of its own. Any sign of resistance by a prisoner would trigger a violent response that could easily spiral out of control. At such moments, Dillon notes, deed usually preceded thought. Guards would spontaneously cross an invisible line, commit an unprecedented act of violence, and subsequently justify the transgression in ideological terms. Blaming the victim, perpetrators would devalue and degrade the prisoners, often to the extent that they seemed to lose sight of the inmates as fellow human beings. Indeed, it is common to assume that extreme devaluation or dehumanization of the victims is morally and
psychologically necessary in order to kill them with a clear conscience. Yet Dillon rightly resists the idea that the Dachau SS dehumanized their victims. Interactions between captors and captives were complex and varied, sometimes even personal, and guards systematically sought to torment and humiliate the prisoners. One of the great merits of Dillon’s book is that it brings out some of the inter-subjective subtleties of violence in the concentration camps.

The book ends with a warning. ‘In a Europe where the social and political dislocations of the interwar era may yet come to feel less remote’, Dillon darkly concludes, it is important to understand how organized terror and violence can come into being. Here the story of the Dachau SS has a lot to tell us.

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‘No operation is of such doubtful issue as the landing in an enemy’s country for the purpose of conquest. Modern, and British history in particular, is full of disastrous failures in the attempt, and those which have succeeded have been, generally, most hazardous.’ So wrote Lieutenant General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, strategic adviser to Lord Raglan, prior to Britain’s costly and controversial expedition to the Crimea. Yet, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, was convinced that only the destruction of Sevastopol could draw ‘the eye tooth of the Bear… and ’til his fleet and naval arsenal in the Black Sea are destroyed there is no safety for Constantinople, no security for the peace of Europe’. Predictably, the views of politicians overrode those of their military advisers with what Mungo Melvin describes as ‘near-calamitous’ consequences. In June 1854, the British Cabinet unanimously favoured attacking Sevastopol. The Secretary of State for War conveyed this decision to Raglan, who was to command the expedition. He replied, forthrightly, that he would do so ‘more in deference to the views of the British government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy’s forces, or to their state of preparation’.