
This book explores the motivation of ‘old-regime’ (essentially eighteenth-century) European common soldiers. It contests the view that, unlike the ‘enthusiastic citizen-soldier’ (p. 2) of Napoleonic France, old-regime soldiers were drilled into ‘submissive military automations’ (p. 1) and forced to fight under threat of punishment. Berkovich draws on published personal narratives written by some two hundred and fifty common soldiers, mainly from Britain but with substantial numbers from other European countries, and assesses the reliability of using these sources. Throughout he sets his work in the context of modern sociological thinking, much of it focussing on the military in World War II. Key ideas are that institutional values play a more important role than pay and conditions in sustaining morale and that small groups enforce standards of behaviour and support individuals under stress. He adds to recent historiography on the partially consensual nature of army discipline in the eighteenth century, pointing out that mutinies were usually successful for the men in general, although risky for participants and that officers favoured maintaining their moral authority over observing the letter of the law.

Berkovich identifies three stages of motivation: to enlist, to fight at a time when armies ‘could expect to lose up to a third of their men in the course of a single battle’ (p. 14) and ‘the most fascinating’ to put up with the hardships of daily army life because it ‘covers the bulk of one’s military service’ (p. 11). He puts forward a rather complicated theoretical model which links these stages to material and immaterial incentives and coercive, remunerative and normative compliance. Thus men were motivated to stand their ground in combat by fear of punishment, greed for plunder and honour.

His analysis of desertion is particularly thorough and interesting. He brings together anecdotal material from his personal narratives with quantitative analyses of military records from a number of countries. Soldiers deserted because of harsh or unfair treatment, some were straightforward bounty jumpers and one pacifist was encouraged to desert by his officers. New recruits and men serving in a foreign army were more likely to desert, it was more frequent in wartime and in units on the march or due to be sent abroad, and peacetime desertions decreased over the eighteenth century. Relatively few deserters were caught and the majority who were went unpunished. In line with modern thinking, he found that the death penalty did not deter desertion but a higher risk of being indicted for the crime did.
At the heart of his discussion of motivation is a culture of honour among the men and the key importance of networks of friendship and loyalty. Men felt shame at defeats that were not their fault and bravery was very important. ‘Withstanding hardships was a point of pride’ (p. 182). Generosity, especially buying drinks for comrades, was valued and those who did not conform were ostracised. Men helped and supported each other, and felt guilty if they did not fight with their comrades.

Berkovich brings out how soldiers of different nationalities gave similar accounts of why men did their duty in combat. Interestingly they attributed similar motivation to their enemies. They mentioned ‘personal bravery, hope of reward and fear of punishment’ and thought that veterans learned to approach danger ‘without thinking’ (p. 195). They approved of fighting for king and country, religion, fatalism and hedonism gave consolation and they thought that enemy committed barbaric crimes. Officers’ patronage was important and their social authority was reinforced by moral authority gained from taking care of the welfare of their men, fighting beside them, encouraging them before battles and thanking them afterwards. They also kept them in touch with wider military developments.

Overall, the cumulative evidence that coercive discipline played a relatively minor role in the motivation of common soldiers is strong. Although I think that the interpretative value of Berkovich’s use of sociological theory is variable, it is always interesting, and he never allows the theory to distort his interpretation of the evidence.

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Established in 1933, Dachau was the first concentration camp in Hitler’s Germany and a stronghold of the Nazi revolution. In Dachau & the SS, historian Christopher Dillon studies the men who guarded the camp. Dillon sees Dachau as a crucial training ground for the atrocities that were to come; the camp was an ‘academy of violence’, whose graduates would go on to staff and command other camps throughout the Nazi empire. The ‘Dachau School’ taught the SS the methods of terror, and instilled in them a highly gendered ethos of male comradeship, loyalty, and steely determination. Unfortunately, the Dachau SS managed to destroy most of