drug, Pervitin (methamphetamine), known to prevent sleep while intensifying the experience of one's consciousness. I am perhaps more sympathetic to interpretations that stress the influence of psychoactives over the conduct, progress and nature of military campaigns, and Sadie Plant's cultural study, Writing on Drugs (1999), has done much to illuminate humanity's enduring and symbiotic relationship with drugs. However, I can only agree that Ohler pushes this link beyond the point of breaking; especially as his exploration of the military environment lacks breadth, depth and context.

He is not the only scholar to do so, and the work of Martin Francis on the RAF (The Flyer, 2008) or Nicholas Rasmussen on the Axis and Allied powers more generally, demonstrates a tendency for those writing on drug use in the military context to extrapolate some fairly sweeping conclusions. For example, while the figure of 72 million amphetamine tablets is often cited as the total number purchased for British forces during the Second World War, we have perhaps less than 100 examples of oral or autobiographical testimony from service personnel actually using the drug. It is only comparatively recently, by speaking with veterans and by exploring oral history material held by the Imperial War Museum, that scholars are beginning to get a feel, at least in the British context, for the scale and personal experience of amphetamine use during the conflict (Pugh, ‘Bomber Command and the Use of Benzedrine Sulphate’, 2016). Importantly, this is not to suggest that the conclusions of Ohler are incorrect, but it indicates that a more cautious approach to the subject is needed. This will enable military historians to establish a better understanding of the place of drugs in conflicts such as the Second World War.

If you choose to read Blitzed you will find it an engaging and entertaining piece of journalistic history. I suspect, like me, you will also find it troubling based on its tone, scholarship and engagement with the literature. However, it has got us talking about drugs and warfare and that can only be a good thing.

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From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the two World Wars, the Indus Frontier was one of the crucial borders of British-India in particular and the British Empire in general. It was a live frontier, where the Pathan (Pashtun) tribesmen fought
'small wars' with British imperial forces. On three occasions, these small wars escalated to medium level conventional wars between Britain and Afghanistan. The British not only had to tackle the challenge of counter-insurgency but also the problem of Czarist Russian interference. Several scholars like Brian Robson, T.R. Moreman, Chris Tripodi have studied the tactical-operational and strategic issues linked with the British-India’s North-West Frontier (north and central part of the Indus Frontier). A few like Hugh Beattie and Andrew M. Roe have also turned their attention towards the badlands of Waziristan, along the present day Pakistan-Afghanistan border where the Tehrek-i-Taliban is now operating. However, the southern part of the Indus Frontier, especially Baluchistan and the Bolan Pass have yet to receive rigorous historical attention. In Balochistan, the British and the Great Game, Tony Heathcote sets out to redress this imbalance and show how British policy makers found themselves getting involved in this otherwise under-investigated part of India’s frontier.

Bigger than present day Germany, Baluchistan comprises 134,000 square miles and remains sparsely populated. It is bounded by the Arabian Sea in the south, Iran in the west and Afghanistan in the north. Developing themes found in his SOAS PhD thesis, Heathcote, a historian of the British armies in India, offers us an exploration of the interconnections between British policy towards Afghanistan and the way in which imperial control over Baluchistan was formulated. Tracing the work of political officers like R.G. Sandeman, James Browne and later Hugh Barnes, the book reveals the changes in policy as the British sought to replace the Khan of Kalat's rule with direct control over Baluchistan. In the process Heathcote examines the divergent interests of the Brahui Sirdars and the Marris and how an imperial divide et impera policy manifested itself in practice.

Heathcote offers a fascinating narrative of the policy challenges facing the British in Baluchistan. Nevertheless Heathcote misses the opportunity to develop a stronger and more analytical line of argument. His painstaking research shows how British control over Baluchistan became more direct between the 1850s and the 1890s. However, his account would have benefited from a more detailed evaluation of British policy. As early as the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), it became clear to the British that the terrain made it impossible for a big army to march from South Afghanistan to West India through the Bolan Pass. Despite this the British spent much time, energy and money to establish direct control over Baluchistan. Unfortunately Heathcote does not offer a completely compelling explanation as to why this was necessary. Was British involvement the product of imperial paranoia and an overestimation of the threat from Russia? Was the change in policy an example of mission creep by local British agents who were not held to account by their superiors? Or was it the product of local conflict between Bombay and Calcutta?
If Heathcote had compared British policies towards Baluchistan with those followed in, for example, Waziristan then this book could have made an even more valuable contribution to our understanding of British frontier politics. Such an account might have started with a recognition that the Raj subsidized indigenous chiefs both along the Bolan and the Khyber Pass. It might then have shown how radical Islamic religious tendencies along with the mullahs and jirgahs played a more volatile part in Waziristan than in Baluchistan. This would then have allowed Heathcote to draw analytical conclusions as to the relative reasons for British involvement in Baluchistan. This would have demanded greater use of the (typically much underutilized) military department proceedings at the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Such details aside, Balochistan, the British and the Great Game is a good addition to the frontier studies of British India and will be of interest to anyone who wishes to understand the ongoing volatility in Baluchistan today.

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Bacon butties, self-styled poufs and honky-tonk joannas make this probably the lightest book on the Falklands Conflict to date; it is certainly the only one that highlights diverse sexual orientations. The focus is the North Sea Ferries’ Norland, whose steward and Liberace-style pianist Wendy (Roy) Gibson came to national prominence through Para Ken Lukowiak’s controversial memoir, A Soldier’s Song (1997).

All in the Same Boat compiles ten informal personal testimonies to create a chronological history. This is the partial tale of how a matey, 94-strong, civilian ‘family’ switched from chugging between their Hull homes and Zeebrugge to hosting and transporting thousands of often antagonistic military guests to the far-off South Atlantic: Naval Party 1850; 2 Para; 3 Para; and three lots of Argentinian POWs partook of the Norland’s maternal hospitality.