commercial or cultural influence being exerted onto the world’s stage. That diminishment of influence corresponded to a diminishment of Britain’s ability to combine diplomatic, economic and military power to best advantage. The exposure to these ideas is not nearly long enough, however, more a mere appetiser of thought that requires satisfaction to be found elsewhere. That is the pity of the book overall, that it is not allowed to be more substantial and explorative on many of the intelligent and nuanced connections it makes to explain the Navy and empire’s ability to create power.

Such a case has been made before and by many over the past two or three decades, some in more detail regarding the various constituent parts of the empire, some with a greater depth of explanation of the Navy’s role. The bibliography and footnotes provided in this study will allow readers interested in the ideas introduced so well here to be followed up for further investigation. The story also is not London centric, flipping around the empire to give tastes of the Australian, Indian, Canadian and other far-flung commentaries on the imperial system. Through such a geographically diverse approach the book allows the reader to engage more fully with the entirety of the topic in question and avoids creating a uniform vision of empire and naval power. As a first introduction to the idea of empire and the naval power that underpinned and represented it, this book is well worth a look. It is one of those works that is more than what it at first appears to be, a rare thing in this age of academic hyperbole and self-declared “definitive” studies. Easy to read and follow, the book is a pleasure to have on one’s shelf.

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Out of the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan emerged a reluctance within the Transatlantic policymaking community to deploy large numbers of combat troops to fight the internal wars of others. Much better, it was argued, to send smaller numbers of military advisors and let the locals do their own fighting. This idea held obvious attractions. It demonstrated commitment without actually committing much, it provided seemingly meaningful participation without unwanted publicity, and it was relatively cheap in terms of blood and treasure. However, as the authors of this new book highlight, the proponents of the 'advisory' fad, like the counterinsurgency
enthusiasts before them, need to tone down their excitement and carefully examine the historical record before advocating 'new' silver bullet solutions to wicked security problems.

In this broad survey of advisory missions a highly cautionary tale is told. Unfortunately, whilst cautionary, the tale could have been told more effectively. Although the authors do a superb job examining numerous advisory missions the key weakness is their focus on the 'struggle for hegemony'. In their view, advisory missions are a component of a hegemonic agenda. On the one hand, the authors are seemingly correct when they argue that, whether implicitly or explicitly, the hegemonic purpose often constitutes a significant shaping aspect of advisory missions, if not the underlying motivation for them. On the other hand, the near total exclusion of investigation into the hegemonic policy agendas of states that sponsor these missions is a serious shortcoming of this book. By trying to link advisory missions with a wider hegemonic political agenda, but without bothering to discuss what that agenda is and place the advisory missions in the context of non-advisory activities, this work needlessly over-reaches itself.

Regrettably little effort has been made to examine advisory missions from the cost-benefit perspective of the policymakers that initiate them. Effectiveness can mean different things to different audiences. Though an advisory mission may fail at the local level, it may succeed at a higher level, or vice versa. Without addressing the political motivations underlying the advisory missions it is problematic to try to make any assessment of whether these missions succeed or fail in achieving their intended purpose. Surely it is not implausible to suggest that sending advisors to a country may be more about short-term domestic politics or international reputation than about improving the local conditions or seeking control in the long-term.

Another shortcoming of the book is its over-emphasis on Afghanistan, though paradoxically this is also the book's main strength. The two principal authors are experts on Afghanistan and their chapters on the Soviet and US/NATO advisory missions in that country are both first rate. By contrast, the non-Afghan chapters are useful but are of a lesser caliber than the Afghan ones. The book thus reads as if it started as a study of advisory missions in Afghanistan – indeed, more than half the book is about the Afghan case – but then for some reason the topic was extended to incorporate a much broader selection of advisory missions. Had the authors chose to limit their focus to Afghanistan rather than attempt a more global approach they would have been on much stronger ground. Instead they are less convincing in trying to combine a broad survey with a single in-depth country study.

As it stands, the political science aspects of the book may be somewhat off-putting to practitioners who prefer to focus on the case studies. Similarly, political scientists
may find the discussion of hegemony unpersuasive. At best, readers are almost certain to find more value in the individual parts than in the whole. These limitations notwithstanding, this volume probably contains the most extensive survey on advisory missions that has yet been published and will be of great value to researchers. Of particular note is the excellent discussion of Soviet bloc advisory missions, relying heavily on Russian-language source material. Likewise, the chapters on the post-2001 advisory efforts in Afghanistan provide the reader with top-notch field research and first-hand insight. The authors should also be commended for not limiting themselves to military, police, and intelligence advisory missions; instead, they devote a considerable portion of the book to other types. Moreover, the authors succeed in raising many red flags that will hopefully be heeded by policymakers and practitioners.

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The role of the press in Britain in the era of the First World War has long been recognised as being of critical importance. Charles à Court Repington, successively military correspondent of The Times and the Morning Post, was the single most significant military journalist of the period. Impeccably well-connected, Repington possessed a keen analytical brain, and his journalism was both admired and feared. By producing this very welcome and well-researched study, the distinguished historian A.J.A. Morris has filled an important gap in the literature.

Repington’s background was as an army officer. Forced to resign his commission in 1902 because of a scandal, (he blamed his fellow Rifleman, Henry Wilson, for wrecking his military career), Repington picked up his pen to earn a living. Repington, as Morris graphically portrays, was exceptionally extravagant. Perhaps his most enduring work, The First World War, was published in 1920 in an (inevitably unsuccessful) attempt to clear his debts. This book took the form of a diary, in which he had no compunction about recounting his private conversations with the great and the good. While anyone speaking to him would have had a fair idea of the risks - Morris includes a caricature by Max Beerbohm, in which Repington is shown clutching a notebook. But the book outraged its victims, and reinforced Repington’s reputation among the elite as an untrustworthy bounder. His diaries are an invaluable source for the historian, but their publication reinforced the unflattering image of