recognition is absent in Keen’s work. The narrative is told through three characters – Colonel James Johnstone, the British Political Resident in Manipur from 1877 to 1886, Frank St Clair Grimwood, the British Resident between 1888 and 1891, and Frank’s wife Ethel. Everything is conveyed as they retell it in their published memoirs – Johnstone’s My Experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills (1896) and Grimwood’s My Three Years in Manipur and Escape from the Recent Mutiny (1891) – or though the Report of the Inquiry that followed. I long to read of

Usurba the palace guard, of what he thought, felt, hoped or dreamed, but his account is absent – not so much a *dramatis persona* as a dumb and benumbed stage-prop. We also live in the wake of social and cultural histories of revolt and protest and sociologies of violence. Keen’s pithy conclusion that the Manipur Uprising was sparked by ‘the traditional uncritical devotion of Indian subjects to their local ruler’ is not supported by any evidence in her work or by what we know of similar rebellions of the period. There is nothing simple or uncritical of the act or manifestation of violence.

So is this good history? Caroline Keen’s work on Manipur is an interesting piece on an under-explored episode and corner of British India. But its lack of theoretical and methodological rigour does not make it a particularly successful or convincing work.

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Spencer Jones is rapidly gaining a commendable reputation as an academic editor. In *Courage without Glory* he has assembled a team of fifteen contributors, many of them from the emerging powerhouse of First World War studies in the West Midlands, and has given them the opportunity to write, often in extraordinary detail, upon aspects of the British military experience on the Western Front in 1915. He has also identified a theme that underpins most of these essays, namely that the learning process of the British Army began not with actions on the Somme, and its aftermath, but in the fighting of 1915 and the lessons drawn from it. Finally, he has found a publisher in Helion & Company willing to provide both substantial space for each essay and support for the writing with proper footnotes, 60 illustrations, and 15 colour maps of a very high quality. Doubtless the decision to include Helion’s commissioning editor on his team, and allow him to write the longest and most heavily footnoted chapter, helped!
In the introduction and first chapter Jones sets the context for this book and explains why this 1915-centred volume is focused upon the Western Front, and not Gallipoli. Having entered the war 'conceptually and materially ill prepared' for trench warfare, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had not only to recover from the losses of 1914 but also adapt to the challenges posed by this new form of warfare. The army had to improvise despite occupying unfavourable ground and suffering from a shortage of officers, Territorial units of variable quality, and New Army battalions of unknown efficiency. The defeats of 1915, he argues, served as a 'bloody apprenticeship' and a learning process that was both 'slow and inconsistent'.

The ensuing chapters cover the 'Great Shell Scandal' from a purely technological (and not political) perspective; the high command, emphasizing Robertson's role in undermining Sir John French; and the demands upon Henry Horne as a divisional commander at a time when staff officers had little combat experience, and training lacked the benefits that would flow from the training schools established in 1916-17. Thereafter Patrick Watt, using an extensive array of manuscript sources, reviews the tensions that bedevilled pre-battle planning for Neuve Chapelle, concluding with a fierce critique of Rawlinson's contributions.

1915 of course witnessed important innovations in warfare, and hence there are chapters on the increasing use of the Royal Flying Corps in reconnaissance missions, and in providing artillery observation for the Royal Artillery, and in the first use of poison gas. While Kenneth Radley recounts the well-known sacrifices of the Canadian forces in the chlorine attack of 24 April, Tom Williams provides fascinating insights on the fate of a Territorial battalion, the 5th King's Own, which ceased to exist as a fighting force by 10 May after helping to prevent the enemy from exploiting its initial breakthrough. Like Adrian Gregson, in an equally perceptive account of the 1/7 Battalion King's Liverpool at Festubert, Williams uses personal accounts, often culled from the provincial press, to complement the material from war diaries, regimental histories and War Office sources.

Contributors cover all the major battles of 1915, indicating the lessons learned from Festubert, Second Ypres and Loos. While they all root their arguments in primary and printed primary sources, Michael LoCicero provides additional insights from German accounts of Second Ypres. However, Brian Curragh, in analysing the British first use of gas at Loos, might have referred to the extensive writings of Donald Richter and other chemical-warfare specialists. In a battle, too, that inflicted devastating casualties upon Scottish units, he neither refers to Scottish commentary beyond one divisional history and war diary nor to the material held in regimental museums north of the border.
Nevertheless, this is highly impressive collection of essays. As Brian Bond observes in his foreword, it is hugely reassuring to see the arrival of a new generation of military historians of ‘proven ability and admirable dedication’. Both Spencer Jones, the editor, and Duncan Rogers of Helion must be commended for providing a superb volume in which these writers can display their talents.

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Given the attention lavished on irregular warfare over the past decade or so, it is hardly surprising that Clausewitz’s ideas on such matters have attracted interest. To date, however, most of his relevant writing has remained untranslated and therefore inaccessible to those without German. An exception is the short Chapter 26, “Arming the People”, that appears in Book VI of Vom Kriege. Christopher Daase and James W. Davis have sought to rectify this situation by presenting us with some additional pieces of Clausewitz’s work—in each case translations of documents originally edited by the German scholar Werner Hahlweg. An introductory essay by Davis explores the relevance of this material to recent debates within Clausewitz scholarship.

Much the longest of these documents consists of Clausewitz’s notes on small war, which he delivered as lectures at the Kriegsakademie in 1810 and 1811. Here he addresses, in great detail, the well-established practice of small war that had developed during the previous century. This involved independent operations by small units of (mostly) regular soldiers whose mission was to provide security for the main body of an army through activities such as reconnaissance, screening and delaying the enemy’s approach. Such units routinely encountered numerically superior forces and were therefore encouraged to eschew decisive engagements. Emphasis was placed on exploiting mobility and surprise, and on employing musketry rather than shock action. As such there was something of the modern-day guerrilla about their exploits, although these were intended to support the operations of a regular army.

Also included is Clausewitz’s Bekenntnisdenkshrift of 1812, which contains an argument for the feasibility of renewed (post-Tilsit) resistance against France, by means of both regular forces and popular resistance in the form of a Landsturm. Here he views the latter’s task as one of conducting raids against enemy forces that penetrated into the